

F. AMORY R. S.
SPEECHES CIA

27 August 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE):

1. The Department of State and U.S.I.A. recommend these changes in the draft of the speech you are scheduled to deliver to the Wisconsin National Guard Association on Saturday, 29 August 1959:
2. Page 3, where you state, "even if we are jumped first" (re nuclear surprise) reads too much as though you are giving too much credence to surprise.
3. On page 8, instead of "Soviet forces which will face the ... West," it is recommended that you say, "Soviet forces which would face the ... West."
4. On pages 10 and 11 it is recommended that you change the several references to "Commies" to the less gentle and more direct word "Communists."
5. On page 11 strengthen the reference to Communist objective to absorb Kerala. A recommended rewording of the text is indicated on page 11. It is also recommended that on page 11 you omit direct, specific reference to one party -- the Congress Party -- whose incompetence, it is true, did exist and was exploited by the Communists. Why not say instead "incompetence of other parties"?
6. In the last sentence on page 12 surprise is expressed that CIA should publicly admit that the U.S. has "its secret services" for secret operations, as against secret intelligence.
7. On page 14 a point of grammar is raised. Either omit the word "is", or restore a word such as "what" which may have been inadvertently dropped by the typist.
8. It is recommended that the above minor changes from U.S.I.A. and State be adopted.
9. In order to meet the responsibilities of this office, it is requested that you furnish us with a copy of the speech, if you are going to use a text, or a copy of the notes (such as these herewith), if you are going to talk from notes. We will, of course, be called upon by the press, once you speak, to furnish copies of your speech.
10. Information is also requested as to the hour of day or night when your speech will be made.

STANLEY J. GROGAN
Assistant to the Director

Enclosure

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M.P.C. *rupe*

Both State and USIA have cleared the draft of M. Amory's forthcoming speech of August 29, and have suggested the following minor changes and queries:

State (Hurd):

- pp. 10 and 11: change several references to "Commies" to less gentle and more direct "Communists".
- p. 11: strengthen reference to Communist objective to absorb Kerala; see suggested re-wording in text
- p. 14: grammatical point: either omit word "is" or (my alternative suggestion) restore a word, such as "what", which may have been inadvertently ~~ly~~ dropped by the typist.

USIA (Halsana):

- p. 3: "even if we ~~(are)~~ jumped first" (re nuclear surprise) reads as if writer is giving too much credence to surprise.
- p. 8: instead of "Soviet forces which will face the ... West," ~~is~~ say "Soviet forces which would face the ... West..."
- p. 11: omit or revise wording of the fact that two provinces in Laos "have never been fully integrated into the Kingdom": to avoid needlessly needling or offending our friends on a sensitive sore point which is, admittedly, a fact.
- p. 11: likewise, re Kerala, omit direct specific reference to one party--the Congress Party, whose incompetence (it is true) did exist and was exploited by Communists: why mention specific party, USIA asks. Why not say ^(malik) "of other parties", ~~instead~~
- p. 12: USIA raises eyebrow that CIA should be publicly admitting that US has "its secret service" for secret operations (as against secret intelligence).

DRAFT OF SPEECH TO WISCONSIN NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION
by Robert Amery, Jr., Deputy Director (Intelligence) CIA
Green Bay, Wisconsin 29 August 1959

Introduction. - Personal reminiscences of association with 32nd Div at
Saider, Aitape & Briniumor River
Small world dept story of Sgt. Hawkins - Halo contenders plea & rescue

I

Citizen soldiers in a particularly good position to grasp nature of present
crisis possessing as it does military and non-military facets.

I would like to back off a bit before focussing on Soviet aspects to call
attention to the many revolutions thru which this world is now passing.

In no particular order they include--

- 1. Technological - production - automation - mankind's ability**
to provide goods and services in quantities undreamt of in the past century.
- 2. Communication - travel & ideas & propaganda - two aspects**
Within a country under dictatorship, a radical step, e.g.
Chinese communes, can be implemented almost overnight. From
country to country ideas, arguments can bat back & forth around
the world in micro-seconds
- 3. The demographic revolution or more popularly the population**
explosion - deriving in part from technological revolution in
mastering disease and drastically cutting death rate.

World population growing every twenty years by the total number of people on all the earth at the end of 19th century.

4. Military - the million to one ratio of destruction ^{if plain} and the elimination of time to prepare and virtual elimination of time for warning and activation of prepared measures -

Not just another step forward in destruction like the long bow or gunpowder but the most fundamental change in human history.

These by themselves would present appalling problems to our generation but to them has been added the Communist Revolution. Its menace thus must be viewed against the background of the other revolutionary forces at work in the world.

We are a revolutionary people born in the turmoil of 1776 or 1848 and have no reason to doubt our capacity to cope with novel ideas or new forces. At the same time we must recognize the true nature of the antagonist that threatens not just to upset our established order but to supplant our most cherished ideals with concepts we have for generations rejected and abhorred.

II

The threat as I see it is three fold - direct naked military power, indirect erosion of free societies by subversion, and thirdly a straight out effort to outpace us in the non-military aspects of power.

Each of these subdivisions of the threat is worth separate analysis and I shall do so in an effort to give a balanced picture but I'd stress first and last the close interrelation between the parts or the integral

nature of the menace as a whole.

III

On the military side there has at times been much complacency and at others much alarmism but the essential facts have been repeatedly given the American people by the senior officials of the government, and I shall spare you a cataloguing of ^{the Soviet} their divisions, airplanes and submarines. What it adds up to is a formidable array of military power capable—if not offset by adequate striking force—of conquering the free world or terrorizing it piece by piece into submission to communist will. But given our own and our allies' forces this great military might is effectively counter-balanced today and can be next year and in the decades to follow provided we stay the pace. To do so may well be ever more expensive because already the Soviets annually devote to military ends an economic effort that is approximately the same as our own and they have demonstrated a willingness to continue to plow the same proportion of their constantly increasing gross national product into the military sector whereas we have been inclined to level off at a constant annual amount.

The first object is very simple - to keep in being a force with the manifest capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet homeland even if we are jumped first. We firmly believe that so long as we do have this capability there will be no danger of deliberate initiation of general war against us because ~~as I shall point out later~~ there is no evidence of nihilism or suicidal mania on the part of the Soviet Leaders.

The second object is to deter local adventures of a military or quasi military nature - what is sometimes called peripheral aggression. For this highly mobile hard hitting forces capable of quick counteraction in support of locally available forces in the country attacked are needed. Here we see the need for our military assistance program and also the need for our reserve components, the latter to be prepared to reconstitute our strategic reserve as the same may be committed either to meet or to anticipate local aggression.

I have no competence to engage in argument as to just what the specific quantity or composition of such forces should be -- that is for the JCS, Sec/Def and Congress, but given appropriate forces and the will to use them there is every reason to believe that Moscow and Peiping will be deterred from piecemeal aggression as effectively as they are from global attack.

The history of the period since Korea tends to confirm this judgment. Though there have been numerous cases of threats to send volunteers to fight against the West in Egypt, Syria and Southeast Asia, the fact is that these have not been implemented. Even in Indo-China the Chinese Communists confined themselves to sending a few score technicians to assist the Vietminh armed forces rather than directly participating in the fighting.

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III a

Before leaving the military portion of this talk I thought you might be interested in a slight side excursion -- a brief picture of the Soviet's reserve components:

The armed forces reserve system in the USSR is a very extensive organization. Virtually every Soviet male of military age--and some of the females--is registered with the reserve system. The Reserves were established by the Universal Military Service Law of 1939. Reservists are divided into two categories by training and into three classes by age. In Training Category I are all men (approximately 10 million) who have completed the prescribed term of conscription in the armed forces or the security troops - this is normally three years. Training Category II (another 18 million) includes those deferred or incapacitated for various reasons, and women who have had military training and are liable for callup in wartime. Reservists are also divided into three classes by age; up to 35, up to 45, and up to 50. Sometime after reaching the age of 50, depending on rank, a reservist is theoretically no longer liable for recall.

The Military Service Law specifies a quite extensive schedule of reserve training periods for both categories. Privates in Training Category I, and under 35, are liable to be called up for six 2-month periods between the ages of 25 and 35. Between the ages of 35 and 45 they are liable for five 1-month periods. A Captain in Category I,

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and under 35, is liable for three months a year for 10 years. However, this is largely academic since enlisted reservists are seldom ever recalled for active duty, and NCO's and officers only once or twice after their discharge from their three-year hitch. The reason is probably that they cannot be spared from their civilian employment.

Active duty training is performed in units or branches of the regular establishment according to the reservist's occupational specialty. Reserve training units do not exist in the USSR. Enlisted reservists may attain NCO rank by taking short refresher courses with local regular units. Officers are authorized to take correspondence courses with the various service academies. Such courses presumably count as part of the requirement for promotion to the next higher rank.

Another means of providing reservists with training is through voluntary participation in DOSAAF*. *(Type in line: Paramilitary Aux. Unit)* Many qualified reservists are used as instructors by DOSAAF in such fields as communications, motor mechanics, marksmanship, parachuting, and the like. Air Force reservists give instruction in the 300 aero clubs of DOSAAF. The Navy gives reserve training with the fleet to some of its specialists. Category II men (who have never had their three-year hitch) get the same type of training as outlined above.

About 30,000,000 members

* Volunteer Paramilitary Auxiliary of Army, Navy and Air Force. DOSAAF provides preinduction training for young people, as well as an opportunity to maintain militarily useful skills after completion of service.

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The ground forces by their nature can be expanded rapidly and extensively. The 175 line divisions now on the active list could be expanded to full strength, and 125 other line divisions could be activated (using in part regular cadres) making a total of 300 divisions organized by D plus 30. The equipment for these new divisions is stockpiled throughout the country. The other two services are in a different position.

The Navy mans all of its available ships with a full wartime complement; no Soviet ships are known to be in moth balls. So in the event of a mobilization, the Navy would have over 1,000,000 reservists who could not be used except in an expansion of the naval infantry and the shore establishments. So you can see that a shortage of reservists is not one of the Soviet Navy's problems.

Soviet air force units are at about 85% of T/O&M strength in personnel and equipment. In the event of war, the reservists could be used to form new units using the 20,000 odd aircraft now in reserve. These new units would not, however, be ready for combat for many months because of the complexity of a modern air force. Nevertheless the air force reserve system provides the base for virtually doubling the size of the present large Soviet air force.

It can be seen that the Soviet reserve system is designed primarily to put a large mass army into the field in the shortest possible time. The newly formed divisions would obviously not be well-trained organizations. It is probable that the bulk of the individuals, with the exception of the regular cadre, would not have had any active duty training for

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several years. Furthermore, they would have had no experience in working together. In comparison with some US reserve units, and the US National Guard, the Soviet reservists would appear to be relatively under-trained, having been out of touch with the military for several years. However other factors must be considered. In the first place, the Soviet citizen lives in a highly disciplined society and is used to military discipline. Then he will have had his training in DORAAF and his three-year hitch in the armed forces. At this point he is considerably better trained than most of his American counterparts. The last point to be considered is that the Soviet forces which will face the best which the West has to offer are pretty well up to strength, staffed with regulars and conscripts. These include the 20 divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, the Soviet armies in Hungary, Poland, the European USSR and the Far East and the tactical air armies which support them, and finally the Long Range Air Forces and the Soviet Navy. The Soviets are likely always to keep ready those forces which they estimate to be necessary to defeat the main enemy. The hastily mobilized reserve forces would be used to carry out secondary tasks such as the occupation, if necessary, of the satellites, the occupation of Western Europe, and the invasion of such areas as the Near East, India, and finally the maintenance of order in the homeland in the event of nuclear devastation.

No one would assert that we should model ourselves on the USSR in this regard any more than we match them division for division in active duty divisions but one can at least conclude that so long as

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they regard such an effort as justified our much more modest National Guard and reserve programs would seem hardly extravagant.

IV

I come now to the second element of danger - communist subversion.

This is difficult to characterize in a short space but one thing is clear it is pervasive and many faceted. Every country in the world has a ^{communist} ~~communist~~ party - some large and legal, others tiny and deep underground. Each of these parties under more or less continuous direction from Moscow or Peking is working night and day to create conditions or bring about events that will advance the day of communist world domination.

Inasmuch as what they seek is revolution, they focus on discontent and frustration wherever they find it and ingeniously contrive to build up existing causes of unrest as they find ready made and to create new sources to add fuel to fires. In this they are not only essentially destructive of order and progress but master merchants of hate - playing upon emotions even more than upon intellects.

Latin America for example is particularly in the grip of the revolution of population explosion that I mentioned at the outset. Coupled with envy and antagonism toward the US and its prosperity this is a fertile ground to sow seeds of blind hatred and sanguinary incident. Their apparatus and its propaganda rarely mentions Russia or the advantages of communism - rather they focus on blaming all manner of obvious shortcomings

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and woes on U.S. "imperialistic capitalism." Distorting everything we do and every statement we make. The result was shockingly evident a year ago last spring in Caracas. If you've read Earl Mayo's book about Vice President Nixon you will realize with horror how narrowly he and Mrs. Nixon escaped ~~from~~ being torn limb from limb by an utterly frenzied mob whose mind had been collectively poisoned to homicidal insanity by communist agitators.

It is impossible to believe that the Kremlin leaders actually compassed the assassination of our Vice President but they stand clearly guilty of a wicked irresponsibility in sowing the seeds of deceit and hatred that led to the incident.

Or take Iraq -- the Communist Party there had been energetically driven underground and hounded by the government of Nuri Es Said as had those elements favoring a less authoritarian regime. Last summer's quick coup with its horrifying but limited blood bath was not the work of the ^{Communists} ~~Communists~~ but once it happened they saw a golden opportunity to poison the minds of the people against not ^{only} the old regime but against the new liberal constructive forces and all the influences of Western and Mohammedan civilization. Bloody mob massacres of officers, farcical trials, butchering of religious groups were inspired and directed by the emancipated communists all to the end that chaos should prevail and conditions ripen for final overt seizure of power.

Most recently world attention has been drawn to Laos. This little country has been grappling with enormously difficult problems compounded of

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economic backwardness, difficult geography and deeply grained antipathies between its various races. Two of its provinces appended to it by French fiat have never been fully integrated into the kingdom. Again a ready-made situation for communist exploitation. Tribe is set against tribe, family against family. Guns and grenades are run in from the communist Viet Minh territory. U.S. aid and the government's efforts to build roads and facilities are distorted into imperialist plotting to quote exploit unquote the riches of Laos, and turmoil ensues. When this gets bad enough it is called a civil war and the ~~commies~~ across the frontiers clandestinely or more or less overtly intervene, while their propaganda piously demands that we cease our provocations and dismantle non-existent military bases in the country.

deliberately and of the former - paying into the hands of the
the Indian state of Kerala
A final example is worth touching on briefly — the Indian state of

Kerala —

Communist
Here an effective disciplined ~~of the~~ party exploiting unemployment, religious and caste problems and ~~Congress Party~~ ^{of other parties} incompetence managed to win enough votes in an essentially free election to get named to form the government. For a while they prospered — some not too important but popular reforms were put through — but when responsible for action to cure the basic underlying difficulties of the state rather than just rant about them, they failed miserably. Their only recourse then was to suppress their ~~critics~~ ^{CRITICS} by police state methods. Wide popular reaction as you know then led to complete breakdown and takeover by the federal authorities in New Delhi.

The lesson is obvious that the communist solution inevitably involves force and had Kerala been a separate nation adjacent to the bloc, it would

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That is the kind of struggle we are up against year in and year out on a world-wide basis. Each nation of the free world must in the last analysis be the chief antagonists in its own list. But as a free world leader with great resources, the U.S. must play its supporting role in each of these struggles, waging with all the ingenuity at its disposal the weapons of its diplomacy, its aid programs, its information programs, and, where necessary and appropriate, the resources of its secret service.

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V

On the third and possibly most important aspect of the threat - the Soviets drive to supplant us as the world's number one industrial power - I shall be brief, as the topic has been widely discussed.

I would stress the point that Khrushchev and his colleagues are sublimely confident that this effort is their sure way to their goal of a communist world order. They minimize our achievements and our potential and in certain respects they exaggerate their own accomplishments and prospects, but the key statistics when soberly and objectively viewed lend substance to their hopes and should give serious concern to every thoughtful American.

Though their gross National Product today is only approximately 45% of ours it has been growing over the past decade at $2\frac{1}{2}$ times our rate.

In the decade since 1950 our industrial production has risen 30%; theirs has risen 130%.

In the most significant measures of underlying industrial power the figures are equally startling:

Russian Machine tool production more than four times ours in 1958.

In production of basic industrial materials their annual increase has been 8.8% contrasted with 1.8% for us over the years 1950-57.

Total Investment - again out of a gross economy of less than half our size is $\frac{6}{7}$ ths of ours and investment in industrial capital already exceeds ours.

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They talk about overtaking us in 1972. That is demonstrably optimistic nonsense on their part, but if recent trends continue they will in all likelihood be equal to us in industrial power by the late 1970s— or no further in the future than the beginnings of World War II lie in the past.

Such then is the three pronged challenge pointed at us in this time of multiple revolution. To meet it is required nothing less than the united efforts of an aware and alert American people. Your membership in the Guard evidences your personal dedication to meeting your share of the military portion of the challenge. You can and I hope will do much to contribute to meeting the other aspects. As citizens and taxpayers you can support directly and by example our country's vital programs to bolster the free world's capacity and will to defend itself. And as citizens, business men, professional men and workers you can contribute to making our society and our economy so strong and so rapidly expanding that the Soviet pursuers will never overtake us.

In the last analysis the contest is simply one between those who believe that the only way to run things in this complex topsy turvy world of the second half of the twentieth century is by direction - dictation - downward by a group of self-appointed, self-perpetuating leaders, and those like ourselves who believe the exact opposite — ⁱⁿ the control of affairs economic and political from the bottom upward — from the ballot box and the store counter. We all know ours is the happiest of systems but ^{what?} we must prove— if we are going to turn it over intact to our children— is that it is, for all its loose-jointedness, the most dynamic and effective.